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Abstract
The question of how migration flows affect the labor markets of receiving countries has been widely
debated by the economic literature but still lacks consensus, and rare are the studies addressing it in the
context of high-skill migration. In addition, several Western countries adopted selective immigration
policies to offset domestic skill shortages, while little evidence exists on their effectiveness. This paper
aims to bridge both gaps by taking advantage of a French reform making it easier for firms to hire
high-skill migrant workers in a specific set of occupations lacking native candidates. The analysis uses
a rich set of administrative employer-employee data and relies on a difference-in-differences approach.
Results show that the reform boosted migrants’ hires without causing any harm to native employment,
thus increasing the stock of labor in targeted jobs. In addition, entry wages of foreign workers decreased
twice as much as the ones of natives, suggesting that the latter are in part shielded from the additional
competition. Finally, the paper estimates the elasticity of substitution parameter recovered using the
reform as an exogenous instrument and shows that immigrants and natives are imperfect substitutes
in production, even when they are employed in the same occupations and by the same employer.
JEL Classification: J61, J62, J63
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1 Introduction
The literature on the labor market effects of immigration mostly focuses on flows of uneducated migrants
and refugees2 and still lacks consensus on their impact on native employment and wages. This is in part
due to the empirical challenges surrounding the estimation of the causal impact of immigration flows,
given the pervasive endogeneity in mobility decisions (Dustmann, Schönberg and Stuhler, 2016)3. Among
the papers basing their analysis on natural experiments, a common result is that native workers are in
part shielded from the additional competition, as their labor market outcomes appear to suffer less than
the canonical model would predict under the assumption of perfect substitution in production (Glitz,
2012; Foged and Peri, 2016; Dustmann, Schönberg and Stuhler, 2017). This has been explained by the
fact that migrants often suffer from skill-downgrading and in general possess distinct abilities that result
in differential task specialization with respect to natives (Peri and Sparber, 2009; Dustmann, Frattini and
Preston, 2012; Foged and Peri, 2016). The majority of these works focuses on low-skill migrants, leaving
open the question of whether the effect would be different in the context of an inflow of highly educated
workers. In addition, by taking geographic areas and education levels as units of analysis, the reduced
form results capture the aggregation of different adjustment mechanisms, including the specialization of
natives and migrants in different jobs. Kerr and Lincoln (2010) and Mayda et al. (2018) are among the
few analyzing the impact of high-skill migrants through changes in the H-1B visa policy in the US. They
both find that there is no significant change in native employment and Kerr and Lincoln (2010) show a
small and insignificant effect on wages.
The contribution of this paper is to look at the effect of a quasi-exogenous migration shock restricted
to a set of high-skill professions on employment and wages of natives working in the same jobs and for
the same employers, which allows to test whether perfect substitutability is observed in a context that
rules out the possibility of differential occupational specialization. To our knowledge this is the first
analysis measuring the degree of substitution between natives and migrants at the level of occupations
within plants. The French reform under study lowers the employers’ administrative cost for hiring extra-
European citizens. The professions concerned are called "occupations in tension" and are defined based
2The large waves of low-skill immigration coming from Central America and entering the United States are arguably the
most widely studied, with a focus on the negative wage pressure exerted on low-skill native labor. See for example Card
(2001), Borjas (2003), Ottaviano and Peri (2012).
3Many papers rely on instruments based on past immigration waves (commonly called Shift-Share) or on geographic
and educational differences in exposure (Altonji and Card, 1991; Card, 2001; Peri and Sparber, 2009; Peri, 2012; Cattaneo,
Fiorio and Peri, 2015; Dustmann, Schönberg and Stuhler, 2017).
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on the observed imbalance between the number of vacancies available and the number of unemployed
candidates possessing the relevant qualifications in a given region. The types of competencies involved
vary, but mostly require at least a post-high school technical specialization. One advantage of this reform
is that it introduces a second list of occupations based on similar criteria, where the administrative
procedure is lessened only for workers coming from a narrow set of origin countries. This provides
us with a natural control group for the difference-in-differences analysis, under the assumption that
the treatment intensity is much lower for this second set of jobs. In addition, the richness of the two
administrative employer-employee datasets used makes it possible to test the effect on wages of new
entrants and incumbent workers, both native and foreign, on the stock of employment and on hiring
patterns, thus providing a rather complete picture of the different channels affected. Finally, in the last
part of the analysis we estimate the elasticity of substitution parameter derived from a CES production
function combining native and migrant labor inputs, following a similar method as in Card (2009),
Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012). However, while the unit of
analysis of these papers are cells defined by age, education, and geographic location; we take advantage
of the richness of our administrative data to look within establishments and occupation categories, which
allow to measure the elasticity of substitution at the level where decisions take place: the firm. We then
compare the results obtained from the OLS estimation with the ones resulting from a 2SLS procedure
instrumenting the relative supply of migrant to native workers with the exogenous shock generated by the
reform, which allows us to draw some conclusions on the potential biases incurred by the first method.
Our results corroborate what found in Card (2009), where the IV strategy is based on a shift-share
instrument.
We find that the reform increased the share of hires made of migrants by 13% in target occupations,
and the probability of hiring a foreign employee by 16%, confirming that firms took advantage of the
policy change. The recruitment prospects of natives remained unchanged, thus resulting in an overall
increase of 1.1% in the stock of employment in these jobs. We observe a negative pressure on entry wages,
as the canonical model predicts. The latter is however twice as important on the wages of migrant new
hires (-13.6%) that on the ones of natives (-6.8%), revealing that the firsts are in part shielded from the
additional competition. Furthermore, incumbent native workers do not seem to incur a wage loss while
incumbent migrants see a 2% drop in salary, likely due to slower growth. The heterogeneity analysis
indicates that the impact captured is mostly driven by occupations that were characterized by very high
levels of tension before the reform. Finally, the elasticity of substitution in production between migrants
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and natives obtained from the 2SLS procedure is much smaller that the one resulting from OLS, which
suggests that the standard approach my lead to an over-estimation of the parameter. It is important
to notice that the post-reform period is characterized by the hit of the economic crisis, which is visible
by an overall drop in hires in 2009. While we argue that the econometric strategy can properly account
for it, results have to be interpreted relative to this context, which may have exacerbated the negative
pressure on wages due to the slack demand.
This analysis carries important policy implications. Several Western countries adopted various forms
of selective immigration policies in recent years4. Furthermore, in the US and the UK there is an ongoing
debate about a potential increase in selectivity in the attribution of economic visas, with additional weight
put on the level of education of applicants. While these measures are widely discussed in the policy arena,
there is still a lack of rigorous evidence on their effectiveness. The existing papers on the matter either
adopt a macro-economic perspective (Constant and Zimmermann, 2005; Docquier and Rapoport, 2007)
or take a descriptive approach (Mahroum, 2001; Devins and Hogarth, 2005; Wickham and Bruff, 2008;
Ruhs and Anderson, 2010). This paper provides one of the first in depth empirical investigation of one of
such policies in terms of take-up and labor market consequences for the population of native workers that
face a direct increase in competition. While it does not address whether greater selectivity is desirable
from the perspective of receiving countries, it does suggest that favoring inflows of high-skill workers
with rare competencies can be effective against skill shortages and do not impose an excessive burden
on native employees.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the reform, Section 3 presents
the data and the empirical strategy, Section 4 shows the reduced-form results, Section 5 estimates the
elasticity of substitution between migrants and natives, and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Reform
In France, the labor law gives priority to current residents and EU nationals in the hiring process. If
an employer wishes to hire a non-European citizen that does not currently reside on French territory, he
has to apply for a work authorization at the local prefecture. The latter has to transmit the request to
4For instance, Canada and Australia have a visa point system that encourages high-skill immigration, the H-1B visa
procedure in the US incorporates country quotas to increase workers’ origin diversity, and the UK presents visa facilitations
for migrant workers possessing qualifications that are in shortage domestically.
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the Service of Foreign Labour, which grants it only if two conditions are met. First, the employer must
prove to have searched extensively for a priority candidate before considering to hire a non-European.
Second, the occupation under question must appear as in tension in the statistics collected by the
French Employment Office. The tension indicator measures the ratio between available vacancies in
each occupation and the pool of unemployed workers possessing the required competencies for the job.
A high level of tension thus signals that the occupation is hard to fill. If both conditions are verified,
the authorization is granted to the employer and the candidate is allowed to apply for an economic
visa. Figure A1 in the appendix reports a diagram taken from OECD (2017) that illustrates all the
administrative steps that need to be undertaken before hiring a migrant worker. The procedure is
lengthy and burdensome for employers. All demands have to be submitted in paper format, and despite
the fact that the official time to process requests is set to a maximum of two months, often it takes
much longer in practice, especially when the institutional bodies involved in the final decision are in
disagreement.
In January 2008, the French government introduced a legislative decree that facilitates the hiring
of extra-Europeans within a list of 30 occupations characterized by a high level of tension in the labor
market. The new law states that, for the occupations concerned, the employer is not anymore required
to prove the prior search for a priority candidate but is automatically granted the authorization to hire
a migrant worker. In order to avoid abuses, the Service of Foreign Labour carefully checks that the
qualifications and work experience of the candidate match the occupation for which he is hired and
further controls that the contract conditions, notably in terms of salary, are in line with the standards
for the position. The aim of the reform is to help firms recruiting for professions that suffer from a
scarcity of domestic labor. In a first step the list was defined at the national level, and in a second
phase each region selected a subset of occupations that remained in tension at the local level. As a
result, only five jobs apply to the entire French territory, while the others are only valid in certain areas.
Table A1 in the appendix reports the full list of target occupations and details the regions to which
each of them applies. The main economic activities concerned are computer science (2 occupations),
construction (4 occupations), electricity and electronics (4 occupations), and mechanical construction
and metal processing (4 occupations); and the main job types involved are technicians, engineers and
foremen5.
5Figure A2 in appendix details the exposure to the reform of different broad categories of occupations and sectors.
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For the identification strategy we take advantage of the fact that the legal change under study is
part of a larger effort to reform France’s economic migration policy. In particular, the working group
in charge of the reform established at the same time an extended list of 150 occupations to be open
without restrictions to European nationals coming from member states under transitory regimes6, which
includes the 30 occupations open to extra-EU citizens and 120 additional ones. The definition of both
lists is based on the same set of tension criteria7, such that the professions open only to EU States
under transitory regimes provide a natural control group for the ones open to all nationalities, under the
assumption that while they are similar in terms of pre-reform characteristics, the treatment intensity is
much lower in the first than in the second. Despite the precise description of the indicators used by the
working group, we were not able to find a threshold in the tension data determining the inclusion in
the reform. This is due to the fact that the final lists were decided after a negotiation with the social
partners, which introduced some degree of arbitrariness coming from different political arrangements
(OECD, 2017). While this rules out the option of a regression discontinuity design, we use the tension
data to ensure comparability between the treated and control groups in a difference-in-differences setting.
Figure 1: Economic Migration Flows
Source: National statistics on immigration published by MI-DGEF-DSED. Panel B is a sub-category of Panel A.
6At the time of the implementation of the reform this concerned only Romanian and Bulgarian nationals, which joined
the European Union in 2007, but later it also included Croatians (EU members since 2013). Workers from these countries
did not immediately obtain the right to work in all member states, and in France they continued to be subject to the same
labor market restrictions of extra-Europeans during a probation period that lasted until 2014.
7To precisely measure tension in each occupation, the working group considered several indicators collected quarterly by
the Employment Office: i) the ratio between job supply (vacancies) and demand (unemployed with relevant skills), ii) the
volume of job supply, iii) the volume of job demand, iv) the evolution in the stock of demand and supply, v) the turnover
rate of job seekers at the end of the month, and vi) the share of long term contracts within the job offers. All of the
indicators are collected periodically for each of the 22 regions of metropolitan France and for 225 categories of occupations.
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Figure 1 provides the first descriptive evidence that the labor market did react to the policy change
by attracting larger inflows of migrant workers. Despite the fact that France is a country subject to
important migration flows, only a small proportion of them is made of economic migrants: every year
about 80% of the visas issued are for family reunification or study motives (about 160 thousands migrants
in 2013), while only 10% are delivered for professional reasons (18 thousands migrants in 2013). However,
the number of economic visas delivered nearly doubled between 2007 and 2008 (Figure 1, Panel A), mostly
driven by a striking increase in the visa delivered to extra-Europeans coming in to work as employees
for French firms (Figure 1, Panel B). In contrast, all the other categories of immigration do not show
any significant change in size around the same years, as shown in Appendix Figure A3 and A4. These
patterns are consistent with what is expected from the reform, since the only migrants directly impacted
are the ones that apply to economic visas in order to work for domestic employers. The next section
describes in details the data and empirical strategy used to recover the effect of the reform on employment
and wages.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
The two administrative datasets used in the analysis come from firms’ declarations. The first one
combines the declaration of labor movements (DMMO) with the survey on labor movements (EMMO),
and reports information on all employees’ entries and exits that took place in a given establishment
over the year. The data contains all plants larger than fifty employees and a representative sample
of the smaller ones. The second dataset is derived from the annual declaration of fiscal data (DADS)
and contains employment and wage information on a random sample of 1/12th of all the private sector
employees. The periodic reporting of this data is a legal requirement for firms and both datasets are
further cleaned and verified by the statistical office attached to the Ministry of Labour. Both datasets
allow to follow establishments over time but not workers, except for a short individual panel dimension
included in the DADS, which allows to know the salary and occupation of a worker in the year preceding
the report, if he was already employed by the same plant. For the rest of the paper we use the words
"plant", "establishment" and "firm" interchangeably, always referring to the single physical location where
workers perform their duties.
The DMMO-EMMO data reports the detailed occupation code, the nationality category of the em-
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ployee (French, EU, non-EU citizen), and the nature of the contract of all new hires and terminations.
While the data is originally reported quarterly, we summarize it by year to increase cell size and to
avoid problems of seasonality. The DADS data contains the salary and number of hours worked of each
employee in the sample, the detailed occupation code, and an indication of whether they were already
working for the firm in the previous year, which allows to distinguish between entry and incumbent
wage. In this data the nationality is a binary indicator of foreign workers, so EU citizens are included
among the foreign population. Both datasets report the regional location, the sector, and number of
employees at the establishment level. It is important to notice that workers’ nationality is a proxy for
individuals affected by the reform, since only non-EU citizens wanting to migrate into France with an
economic visa and foreign residents that want to switch from a student to a working visa are concerned,
while the holders of a family reunion visa are allowed to work in any occupation without restrictions.
Nevertheless, given that the discrete jump in 2008 is only observed within economic visas, we can expect
a discrete change in foreign entries within reform occupations to reflect the actual effect of the policy.
The DMMO-EMMO data used in this study covers the period from 2004 to 2014, while the DADS 1/12th
sample covers the period from 2004 to 2015. The agriculture and mining sectors are excluded because
not concerned by either ones of the lists, and establishments with less than 20 employees are dropped
from the DADS data because the detailed occupation codes are not reliable there. Both datasets are
finally merged to a composite index of tension varying by occupation-region-year and constructed using
the data from the Employment Office that served to define the reform8.
The econometric approach used to recover the impact of the policy is a standard difference-in-
differences. The analysis is based on an unbalanced panel at the level of occupations x plants and
treatment and controls are defined at the occupation x region level. A unit of observation is consid-
ered treated if the occupation figures in the list of the reform for the region where the establishment is
located. The main identifying assumption is the absence of group-specific time shocks other than the
reform itself, which insures that the trend observed in the control professions is a valid counterfactual.
For this assumption to hold, the control group needs to present comparable characteristics, especially in
terms of hiring difficulties. Given that the 30 occupations open to non-EU migrants (treated list) is a
8The index combines the following indicators: i) the ratio between job supply and demand registered during the reference
period, ii) the volume of job supply, iii) the volume of job demand, iv) the evolution in the stock of demand and supply, v)
the turnover rate of job seekers at the end of the month, and vi) the share of long term contracts within the job offers. Each
indicator is translated into a standardized z-score using the formula Zscorei = xi−X¯σX , and the final index is computed as the
average of the six z-scores. The latter captures all the information used by the commission to define the list of occupations
for the reform.
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subgroup of the extended list applicable to EU states under transitory regimes (EU list), and that both
are defined using the same set of criteria, it seem natural to use the remaining occupations of the EU list
as a control. Under the assumption that the hiring of Romanians and Bulgarians reacted similarly across
both series of jobs, any difference observed in foreign hiring can be attributed to the greater treatment
intensity of the treated list9. Given that the EU list is much larger, some of the jobs included there
present much lower levels of tension with respect to the treated jobs, which may introduce a bias in the
results if the tension differential is the source of asymmetric time-variant shocks. To reduce this risk, we
exclude from the control group the occupations in the EU list that have a tension index below zero before
200810. After this correction the average tension index is similar across both groups. The other threat
to identification reside in the possibility of migrants changing strategically the occupation for which they
apply in order to enter the list, or of employers changing the job description at the margin to be able
to attract a broader pool of candidates. This would mean that in the absence of the reform the hiring
of migrants in the control group would have grown faster because if would not have been "diverted"
towards treatment occupations. While I cannot completely rule out this possibility, I observe carefully
the hiring trends of control occupations at the moment of introduction of the reform, to check that
there is no drop in foreign applications symmetric to the increase observed in treatment occupations. In
addition, I exclude from the control group the occupations that are too similar in terms of skills required
to some occupations in the treatment group, and that thus could be easily manipulated by employers
or substituted by job seekers11. The fact that the match between an applicant’s qualifications and the
competencies required for the position is carefully checked by the Office of Foreign Labour reduces the
room for tampering.
The analysis on the DMMO-EMMO data focuses on the effect of the reform on the labor movements
in and out of plants. In particular, it tests whether the legal change had an impact on the probability
of hiring a migrant worker and on the share of migrant entries within each occupation. Further, it
checks whether the first order impact crowded-out some employment opportunities for native workers
9Given that in the DMMO-EMMO data we can distinguish Europeans from non-Europeans, we test whether we find
any significant effect on hiring of Europeans and we find none (results available upon request). This is an indication that
the effect on Bulgarian and Romanian hiring is symmetric. Additionally, in the case where they were still hired more in the
control list, then our measured treatment effect on natives would be a lower bound.
10Since the index is computed as an average of z-scores, a value below zero indicates that the job is in the bottom half of
the tension distribution across all occupations in the economy.
11To define similarity, I look at the first three digits of the four-digits occupation codes. For example, I exclude Buyers
and buyers’ support (control occupation) because too close to Merchandisers (treatment occupation), or R&D technicians in
electricity, electronics, and electro-mechanics (control) because too similar to design managers in electricity and electronics
(treatment).
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by looking at the same outcomes for this group. Finally, it measures whether the reform increased the
precariousness of the employment contracts by looking at the effect on the share of temporary contracts
for both migrants and natives. The model chosen to recover the effect of the reform follows a standard
difference-in-differences specification with the addition of a few controls and several levels of fixed effects:
Yoirst = α+ β1Dor + β2Dor ∗ Tt + β3Xoirt + γt + δo + ρr + σs + oirst (1)
Where Yoirst captures the outcomes of interest within occupation o, plant i, region r, sector s and
time t; the treatment identifier Dor is a dummy varying at the region x occupation level and β2 is the
coefficient that directly measures the impact of the reform by estimating the differential trend observed
in the treatment group after the reform (Dor ∗ Tt). Xoirt is a matrix of controls including the logarithm
of plant size and the average tension in each regional occupation during the period preceding the reform,
which allows to correct for any pre-treatment difference due to different levels of tension. Finally, the
model includes year, occupation, region and sector fixed effects. In a robustness check we also test
whether results are sensible to the introduction of additional levels of fixed effects. The standard errors
are clustered at the plant level and the time period considered in the main regressions goes from 2004
to 2010. While the dataset would allow to analyze the effect up to 2014, the further away we get from
the year of reform implementation, the harder it gets to interpret the coefficients are pure impact of the
legal change. In addition, in 2011 the list was temporarily restricted by half, but was put back to its
original state at the end 2012, thus including further complications for longer term analyses. However,
in the graphic analysis we look at the full period available.
An important characteristic of all the flow outcomes is that they present a large number of zeros, since
firms do not hire in all their occupations every year, especially when considering only the population
of migrant workers. These zeros are important, because they signal the firm’s choice of not to hire
at that point in time, and therefore should be taken into consideration in the analysis. Consequently,
linear estimators could lead to biased results. To solve for this issue, we follow the trade literature on
gravity models, which developed unbiased estimators capable of taking into account the large number of
zeros present in bilateral trade data (Beine, Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2016), and that were
further adopted by the migration literature (Alesina, Harnoss and Rapoport, 2016). In particular, for the
estimation of the effect on the share of migrants in total hires and the share of temporary contracts, we
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apply the fractional logit model suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (1996), which is a GLM estimator
of the binomial family that uses a logit link function. This is variant of the Pseudo Poisson Maximum
Likelihood estimator (PPML) proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) that allow to accomodate fractional
data12. Finally, for the probability of hiring natives and migrants, we apply a logit binary model. The
analysis based on the DADS data focuses on the impact of the reform on the total employment within
occupations and plants, to check whether the effects observed on the flows are confirmed using stock
data, and on the gross monthly salary of native and migrant workers, both overall and distinguishing
between newly hired employees and incumbent workers. Given that here the outcomes do not suffer
from the problem of zero-inflation, we use a linear estimator on the same difference-in-differences model
presented in Equation (1) with the addition of plant fixed effects. Here as well we test the sensitivity of
the results to different levels of fixed effects in a robustness test.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
DMMO-EMMO Database DADS Database
Treatment Control Treatment Control
VARIABLES mean/(sd)/sh. posit. mean/(sd)/sh. posit. VARIABLES mean/(sd) mean/(sd)
Share of migrant entries
0,03 0,04 Salary natives 3536 3334(0,15) (0,17) (2113) (2263)
5% 5% Salary native new entrants 3113 2795
N. of migrant entries
0,12 0,10 (1950) (2068)
(1,62) (1,12) Salary native incumbent 3633 34325% 5% (2169) (2313)
Prob. of hiring a migrant
0,05 0,05 Salary migrants 3598 3034(0,22) (0,22) (2273) (5782)
5% 5% Salary migrant new entrants 3191 2664
Prob. of net migrant entry
0,04 0,04 (2034) (9385)
(0,19) (0,19) Salary migrant incumbents 3756 31854% 4% (2361) (4316)
Sh. STC in migrant entries
0,35 0,39 N. of employees in occup. 2,2 1,9(0,45) (0,47) (4,5) (2,9)
2% 2% N. entries from other occup. wn firm 0,72 0,63
N. of native entries
2,10 1,60 (2,08) (1,54)
(8,70) (6,51) N. of exits to other occup. wn firm 0,23 0,2057% 53% (0,96) (0,85)
Prob. of hiring a native
0,57 0,53 Firm size 243 236(0,50) (0,50) (661) (661)
57% 53% Pre-reform average tension 0,19 0,15
Prob. of net native entry
0,36 0,33 (0,20) (0,11)
(0,48) (0,47)
36% 33%
Sh. STC in native entries
0,35 0,37
(0,44) (0,45)
24% 23%
Pre-reform average tension 0,19 0,15(0,20) (0,11)
Firm Size 270,4 274,7
(699,1) (724,0)
N. of observations 291 357 297 178 N. of observations 256’027 282’710
N. of occup. x establishments 154 788 160 138 N. of occup. x establishments 100’306 108’451
N. of establishments 62 546 61 613 N. of establishments 60’146 60’322
Note: All salary variables are expressed in terms of gross monthly salary in Euro 2010. Statistics refer to the unit of analysis occup. x plant x
year.Period considered: 2004-2010, as in the regressions.
12In an earlier version of the paper we looked at the effect on the number of migrants and native hires in each occupation
x plant using the PPML estimator. Results are consistent with the outcomes presented in this version but the absence of
pre-reform common trend cannot be rejected. We thus decided to exclude them from the paper. These results are available
upon request.
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Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the main variables of interest across the two datasets,
separately for treatment and controls. The two groups are similar across most characteristics. Migrants
represent about 3% to 4% of total hires in both treatment and control occupations, and the probability
of hiring a migrant in a given year is about 5%. The probability of net entry measures the likelihood of
having more workers entering a given plant and occupation than exiting the same plant and occupation
in a given year, and it is about 4% for migrants and 35% for natives. In addition, 5% of the occupations
x plants considered hire at least one migrant in a given year while between 50% and 60% hire at least one
native. This fact justifies the use of zero-inflated models fr the flow outcomes. The share of temporary
contracts (STC) in total hires is about 35% in both treatment and control occupations and is similar for
migrants and natives. In the DADS data we observe about 2 employees per occupation within a plant,
the gross monthly salary of natives is on average 3500 Euros in treatment occupations and 3300 Euros in
controls, while foreigners have similar levels of salaries than natives within treatment occupations, they
have a slightly lower salary than natives in control occupations. This signals that the jobs in question
are relatively high skilled, and so are the migrants that are hired to do them. All the salary measures
are expressed in terms of full-time equivalents, to avoid differences explained by hours worked, and are
adjusted for inflation with 2010 as reference year.
Figure 2: Unconditional Growth Index in Hiring Composition
Figure 2 presents a graph showing the unconditional growth index in the share of migrant entries
for both treatment and controls. The common trend seems to hold before the reform, even without
conditioning neither for the level of pre-reform tension nor for the fixed effects. After the reform we see
a clear increase in the in the share of migrants hired within treatment occupations while it remained
stable within control occupations, which comforts the assumption of no strategic shifting in migrants
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applications away from controls towards treatment jobs.
4 Results
4.1 Main results
Table 2 presents the main results obtained on employment flows. Column (1) presents the impact on
the share of migrants in total hires, Columns (2) and (3) look at the effect on the probability of hiring
natives, and columns (4) and (5) show the effect on the probability of hiring migrants. All the coefficients
have to be interpreted in terms of incidence ratios. The reform increased the share of migrants in new
hires by 13.5% on average over the three years following the reform, the probability of hiring a migrant
in a given year rose by 16% and the probability of having a positive net entry of migrants increased by
13.7%. When looking at natives, the probability of entry and net entry are left unchanged by the rise in
foreign inflows, so that the effect in column (1) can bee seen as purely caused by higher migrant entries.
The fact that native employment did not suffer from the reform is not surprising, since the occupations
concerned were chosen because of their hiring difficulties, meaning that firms were employing less people
than they would have liked in these professions. Given the legal requirements associated with the issuance
of work permits, high levels of tension strongly increase the employment probability of migrants. On the
other hand, treatment occupations appear to hire less migrants for a given level of tension, which can
be explained by the fact that these jobs are slightly more skilled than controls and differ from the type
of positions usually taken by foreigners. Finally, as predictable, large firms tend to hire more migrants,
while it is not the case for natives. This can be due to the fact that it is very burdensome and costly for
small companies to go through the procedure of work permit applications, so they tend to focus on local
labor instead.
Table 3 presents the results obtained with the DADS data. The outcomes are inserted in the model in
logarithmic form so that the coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities. The results reported are
based on a similar specification as the one applied to the flow data, with the only addition of firm fixed
effects, and capture the total effect on both the extensive and intensive margins. Columns (1) and (2)
present the results on employment stock, both in terms of number of employees and number of full-time
equivalent workers, Columns (3) to (5) capture the effect on native salaries overall and disaggregated
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Table 2: Main Results on Employment Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Natives Migrants
Share of
migrants in hires P. new hire
P. net positive
entry P. new hire
P. net positive
entry
VARIABLES FCT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT
Treat 0.630*** 0.945 1.096* 0.369*** 0.455***
(0.0925) (0.0582) (0.0600) (0.0473) (0.0682)
Treat x Post Reform 1.135*** 1.004 1.009 1.160*** 1.137***
(0.0369) (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0305) (0.0338)
Pre-reform tension 1.231* 0.991 0.974 1.375*** 1.525***
(0.138) (0.0383) (0.0352) (0.142) (0.161)
log of firm size 1.046*** 1.010** 0.969*** 1.285*** 1.265***
(0.00942) (0.00461) (0.00415) (0.0135) (0.0136)
Constant 0.127*** 2.257*** 0.645*** 0.107*** 0.0498***
(0.0170) (0.140) (0.0361) (0.0132) (0.00699)
Observations 333,519 588,521 588,521 588,479 588,405
R2/ Pseudo R2 - 0.0285 0.0124 0.128 0.104
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at firm level. All regressions include occupation, region, sector and year fixed effects. Coefficients
reported in exponentiated form. Period of analysis: 2004-2010. The Fractional logit model used in column (1) is a glm
estimator of the binomial family that uses a logit link function. It was first proposed by Papke & Wooldridge (1996) to
accomodate zero-inflated fractional outcomes.
into new hires and incumbent workers, Columns (6) to (8) do the same for the salary of migrants. The
first two columns confirm the results obtained on the movement data, showing that the overall stock of
employment in treated occupations increased by 0.8% thanks to the reform, while the number of full-
time equivalent workers increased by 1.1%. Native salaries did not show a significant loss overall, but
the salaries of new hires did incur a drop of 6.8%. On the other hand, the salary of migrants suffered a
significant loss of 3.5%, which can be disaggregated into a 13.6% decrease on the salaries of new hires
and a 1.9% decrease for incumbent workers, which is likely to be the expression of slower growth, since
wages are rarely decreased nominally within the same position. These findings are consistent with the
canonical model of labor market equilibrium, where a positive supply shock generates a decrease in the
price of labor. Nonetheless, the presence of such an important difference on the effect between natives
and foreigners points towards the hypothesis that these two types of inputs may not be perfect substitutes
in production, not even within the same occupation and firm. The salary regressions present very high
R-squared, which can be explained by the battery of fixed-effects used.
Figure 3 provides the validation test for the common trend assumption on the main outcomes and
shows how the effect evolved in the years following the reform. The same graphs for the additional out-
comes not included here are reported in figure A5 in the appendix. The figures plot the coefficients and
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the confidence intervals obtained from a flexible model interacting each year dummy with the treatment
group indicator, showing the estimated difference in trends between treatment and control occupations
in each year of the sample with respect to the last year preceding the reform. Here we include the entire
period available in the data to give a sense on how the trends continued to evolve after 2010, which
is the last year included in the regression analysis13. The difference between treated and controls was
widely not significant before 2008, supporting the common trend assumption. Only in the probability of
net positive entry of natives we see a slight decrease in the difference right before the reform. This may
be due to some anticipation effects, even if the full-list of jobs was not made public before 2008. In a
robustness test we show that the results hold if we exclude 2007 from the analysis. Finally, the effects
on both employment and wages seem to be long-lasting, which can be interpreted as a success from the
point of view of the objective to reduce the level of tension in these jobs.
Table 3: Main Results on Employment Stock and Salaries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All workers Natives Migrants
Log N. of
employees
Log N. of
FTE empl. Log salary
Log salary
new hires
Log salary
incumbents Log salary
Log salary
new hires
Log salary
incumbents
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Treat -1.024*** -1.477*** -1.427*** -1.747** -1.484*** 0.173 -0.334 0.0826
(0.254) (0.314) (0.206) (0.739) (0.0986) (0.162) (0.214) (0.157)
Treat x Post Reform 0.00768*** 0.0106*** -0.00323 -0.0686*** 0.000850 -0.0351*** -0.136*** -0.0191***
(0.00262) (0.00358) (0.00268) (0.0133) (0.00275) (0.00721) (0.0377) (0.00709)
Pre-reform tension -0.00153 0.00274 0.00946 -0.0384 0.0127 -0.00687 0.0972 -0.0111
(0.0226) (0.0277) (0.0156) (0.0461) (0.0161) (0.0490) (0.167) (0.0470)
Constant 1.925*** 2.850*** 8.432*** 8.683*** 8.537*** 7.285*** 7.580*** 7.499***
(0.254) (0.313) (0.204) (0.738) (0.0931) (0.135) (0.156) (0.139)
Observations 473,668 473,579 433,289 91,413 377,431 60,559 15,487 50,072
R-squared 0.492 0.466 0.713 0.761 0.733 0.771 0.800 0.806
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at the firm level. All regressions include firm, occupation, region, sector and year fixed effects. Period of analysis:
2004-2010. Column (2) expresses employment in terms of full-time equivalent. Salary outcomes are measured as the logarithm of gross monthly
salary in 2010 Euros and are expressed in terms of full-time equivalent.
Table 4 presents the results on additional outcomes. The hiring data allows to distinguish between
short term and open-ended contracts, so we construct a measure of share of short term contracts (STC)
in new entries as a proxy for the quality of the jobs (see Column 1 and 2 of Table 4). The reform had
no effect on the quality of jobs obtained by migrants and even decreased by 3.6% the proportion of STC
in native hires, which contradicts the common hypothesis that greater immigration contributes to an
increase in native precariousness. Finally, the short individual panel dimension of the DADS data allows
13Given that the reform was temporarily modified between 2011 and 2012 we exclude the post 2010 period from the
econometric analysis.
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Figure 3: Estimated Treatment Effect by Year
Note: The figure reports the estimated difference in trends between treatment and control occupations every year of the
sample with respect to the last pre-reform year.
to recover whether the individual currently working in a given occupation was employed in a different
occupation in the previous year, conditionally on having the same employer (see Column 3 and 4 of Table
4)14. It appears that the reform increased entries from other occupations within the firm in addition to
raising hiring from outside, but did not create flight to other occupations in the firm, which could have
been a possible native reaction to the increase in competition in treated jobs. In the next section we
present the results of several robustness checks on the main outcomes of interest.
14Even though the DADS data does not allow to follow individuals through time but only firms, in any given wave it
does provide information on what the individual was doing in terms of occupation and wage at year t-1 if he was already
working for the current employer.
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Table 4: Additional Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DMMO DADS
Share of STC in
native hires
Share of STC in
migrant hires
Prob. entry from
other occ. wn firm
Prob. exit to other
occ. wn firm
VARIABLES Frac Logit Frac Logit Logit Logit
Treat 1.351*** 1.256 0.433* 3.785**
(0.120) (0.331) (0.205) (2.529)
Treat x Post Reform 0.964** 1.023 1.040*** 1.005
(0.0154) (0.0544) (0.0140) (0.0197)
Pre-reform tension 0.664*** 0.393*** 1,033 0.928
(0.0387) (0.0746) (0.0460) (0.0580)
Log firm size 0.958*** 0.901*** 1.165*** 1.362***
(0.00586) (0.0132) (0.00645) (0.0103)
Constant 4.357*** 3.953*** 2.522* 0.0146***
(0.382) (0.898) (1.192) (0.00974)
Observations 321,972 29,547 473 714 437,106
R2 / Pseudo R2 - - 0,0345 0.0760
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at the firm level. All regressions include occupation, region, sector and year fixed
effects. DADS regressions also include firm FE. All coefficients reported in terms of incidence ratios. Period
of analysis: 2004-2010.
4.2 Robustness checks and heterogeneity
Tables A2 to A8 in the appendix present the results of several sets of robustness tests. Tables A2,
A3 and A4 perform two different placebo tests, introduce an alternative control group, and perform a
propensity score correction on the employment flows outcomes (Table A2), on the main employment
stock and salary outcomes (Table A3), and on salary disaggregated for new hires and incumbent workers
and for natives and migrants (Table A4). The first placebo test checks the detected effect of a placebo-
reform implemented in 2007 on the sample restricted to the years 2004-2007. A part from a negative
and significant coefficient on the probability of net positive entry of natives, which was already visible
from Figure 3 and may be explained with some anticipation effect, none of the other outcomes appear
significant. The second placebo test considers only the observations in the control group and creates
a placebo treatment indicator taking value one for the half of the observations with the highest pre-
reform levels of tensions. We do this to test that the main results are not capturing some differential
trend explained by skill-shortages themselves rather than by the reform. Here again the majority of the
coefficients are insignificant. The only two of them significant at the 5% level are the share of migrant
hires (negative) and the log of native salary (positive but very small in magnitude). Given that the sign
of the coefficient is in both cases the opposite of what obtained in the main results, we are confident
that if anything the latter are an upper bound. The test using an alternative control defines control
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occupations as all private sector jobs within the top two quintiles of the tension distribution not included
in the treatment list, regardless of whether they appear in the extended list or not. Results are similar to
the ones from the main analysis. Finally, we compute the estimated propensity of entering the treatment
list of occupations given the pre-reform level of tension, and we include the propensity score as additional
control in the main regression. Again results are unchanged from the main analysis.
Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix test how the main results vary when we add different levels of
fixed effects, for the DMMO-EMMO and DADS data respectively. Here we have to go back to a linear
model for the flow regressions to ensure computational feasibility. To ease the comparison with the main
results we report the derived treatment effect in terms of percentage change from baseline at the bottom
of the table (Table A5). For each of the outcomes and in addition to sector and year fixed effects that
are included all along, in the first column we include only occupation and region fixed effects. In the
second column we add firm fixed effects. In the third column we move to a full panel fixed-effect model
since we include fixed effects for the main unit of analysis: occupation x plant. Finally, in the fourth
column we include occupation, region, plant and sector x year fixed effects. The sign and significance
remain the same across specifications for all of the outcomes, the magnitude generally gets smaller when
sector x year fixed effects are included (except for the stock of employment from DADS), while the full
fixed effect model increases the magnitude of the effect on the migrants flows, leaves it unchanged for
the stock of employment, and decreases it slightly for the migrant salary.
Tables A7 and A8 in the appendix test the main specification in different sub-samples, for the DMMO-
EMMO and DADS data respectively. The first column within every outcome excludes the year 2007 from
the analysis to rule out any potential anticipation effect, the second column excludes the year 2009 to
evaluate the results on the years less affected by the economic crisis, and the third column excludes the
construction sector. Several of the occupations in the list specifically target this activity and some voices
in the public debate expressed the fear that the policy may just have contributed to the legalization of
previously illegal workers, defying the purpose of attracting new qualified labor into the country. The
coefficients remain largely similar across all of the specifications. Only the effect on the probability of
net positive entry of migrants becomes insignificant when the construction sector is excluded, but since
the effect on the share of migrant hire and especially on the stock of employment and salary remain
unchanged it may just be due to lack of power, given the very small proportion of positive values in the
sample.
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Finally, we look at the heterogeneity of the effects across some meaningful categories. Table 5 shows
the heterogeneity analysis on the flow outcomes and table 6 does the same for the stock and salary
outcomes. Panel A in both tables splits the sample between the seven regions that experienced a growth
of economic visas above 50% between 2007 and 2008 and the rest of the country, based on the aggregate
figures published by the Ministry of Interior15. Results using both datasets confirm that coefficients on
all outcomes are much larger in magnitude and are more significant when the model is estimated on
the sample of regions that present the highest jump in economic immigrants. In these areas, the share
of migrant hires grew by 17.5%, the probability of hiring a migrant increased by 25% and the stock
of employment in targeted jobs grew by 2.3%. The negative effect on wages is also more important in
these areas, where the average native wage incurred a statistically significant loss of 1.5%. These results
validate that the estimated impact of the reform using plant level administrative data reflects what is
observed in the macro-level statistics.
Table 5: Heterogeneity of the effect on employment flows
Share of migrant hires P. net positive entry of natives P. net positive entry of migrants
Panel A: by type of region Low migrationregion
High migration
region
Low migration
region
High migration
region
Low migration
region
High migration
region
Treat * Post Reform 1.085 1.175*** 0.993 1.019 1.039 1.178***
(0.0549) (0.0510) (0.0144) (0.0189) (0.0477) (0.0473)
Observations 198,434 135,085 356,645 231,874 356,534 231,826
Pseudo R-squared - - 0.0144 0.0104 0.0858 0.0927
Panel B: by tension in occup. Low tension High tension Low tension High tension Low tension High tension
Treat * Post Reform 0.995 1.261*** 0.986 1.028* 0.976 1.252***
(0.0494) (0.0559) (0.0162) (0.0169) (0.0443) (0.0514)
Observations 162,698 170,821 293,040 295,477 292,926 295,438
Pseudo R-squared - - 0.0115 0.0132 0.0905 0.118
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at the firm level. All regressions include occupation, region, sector and year fixed effects. Period of analysis: 2004-2010.
High migration regions are the regions where economic immigration grew by more than 50% between 2007 and 2008, low migration regions are the
remaining ones. Low tension occupations are the 50% of occupations with the lowest level of tension before the reform while high tension are the
other half.
The sample can further be split between the occupations characterized by very high levels of tension
before the reform versus occupations where the tension was relatively lower (Panel B). To preserve the
balance between treatment and controls, we divide both groups in two halfs according to the distribution
of the tension index and re-estimate the effect separately for high and low tension occupations. Not
15The seven regions with the largest growth in the flow of economic visas at the moment of the reform are Aquitaine,
Corse, Ile de France, Languedoc-Roussillon, Midi-Pyrénées, Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, Rhône-Alpes.
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surprisingly, the occupations that reacted the most to the reform are the ones that were previously
experiencing the most severe shortages of native labor. This indicates that the reform was successful in
supporting the firms facing the highest hiring difficulties.
Table 6: Heterogeneity of the effect on employment stock and salaries
Log salary natives Log salary foreigners Log N. employees
Panel A: by type of region Low migrationregion
High migration
region
Low migration
region
High migration
region
Low migration
region
High migration
region
Treat x Post Reform 0.00441 -0.0152*** -0.0259*** -0.0414*** -0.00136 0.0232***
(0.00333) (0.00458) (0.00966) (0.0106) (0.00306) (0.00481)
Observations 273,481 159,808 30,536 30,023 294,521 179,147
R-squared 0.701 0.715 0.747 0.784 0.501 0.487
Panel B: by tension in occup. Low tension High tension Low tension High tension Low tension High tension
Treat x Post Reform -0.00440 -0,00556 -0.0210* -0.0377*** -0.00713* 0.0234***
(0.00396) (0.00377) (0.0114) (0.00949) (0.00393) (0.00382)
Observations 222,648 210,641 29,543 31,016 242,240 231,428
R-squared 0,755 0,765 0,808 0,817 0.550 0,661
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at the firm level. All regressions include firm, occupation, region, sector and year fixed effects. Period of analysis:
2004-2010. High migration regions are the regions where economic immigration grew by more than 50% between 2007 and 2008, low migration
regions are the remaining ones. Low tension occupations are the 50% of occupations with the lowest level of tension before the reform while high
tension are the other half.
5 Elasticity of Substitution between Migrants and Natives
The canonical model of the labor market, notably presented in Borjas (1999), assumes that native and
foreign workers active in the same skill segment can be seen as perfect substitutes in the firm production
function. One of the theory’s predictions is thus that a positive supply shock generated by an inflow of
migrant labor exerts a negative pressure of equal magnitude on the wages of natives and foreigners, as the
two inputs are assumed to be equivalent. Since the empirical literature often found results in contradiction
with the assumption of perfect substitutability, several papers tried to measure this parameter using
nested CES production functions. This paper follows a similar framework as in Card (2009), Manacorda,
Manning and Wadsworth (2012), and Ottaviano and Peri (2012). However, while their estimates are done
within cells of age and education, we compute the elasticity of substitution between migrants and natives
within cells of occupations and establishments. By doing so we take advantage of the richness of our
administrative data to estimate production technology at the level where production decisions actually
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take place: the plant. In addition, the degree of substitution between labor inputs within occupations
is a mechanism rarely explored by the literature and this level of analysis allows us to use the reform as
an exogenous instrument and thus test the robustness of OLS estimations.
In our model the output Yt of a representative firm is produced using labor inputs from different
occupations o assembled through a CES production function:
Yt = At
[∑
o
θotL
σo−1
σo
ot
] σo
σo−1 (2)
where σo is the elasticity of substitution between occupations and θot is the occupation-specific
efficiency parameter that may vary through time because of technological change, globalization etc.
Without loss of generality we normalize ∑o θot = 1. For simplicity, capital is assumed to be fixed and it
is not reported. Further, the labor in each occupation Lot combines inputs from native workers Not and
migrant workers Mot through a CES production function nested into the first level:
Lot =
[
βotM
σE−1
σE
ot +N
σE−1
σE
ot
] σE
σE−1 (3)
Where σE is the elasticity of substation between natives and migrants, and βot is the relative efficiency
of migrants with respect to natives within occupations, which can vary through time if there is a change
in the relative quality of migrants, a change in discrimination biases, etc. By assuming that the marginal
product of each labor input is equal to its marginal cost, we can derive the log-linearized wage equations
of migrant workers as follows:
ln(wMot ) = ln(At) +
1
σo
ln(Yt) + ln(θot) + ln(βot)− 1
σE
ln(Mot) + (
1
σo
− 1
σE
)ln(Lot) (4)
and of native workers analogously:
ln(wNot) = ln(At) +
1
σo
ln(Yt) + ln(θot)− 1
σE
ln(Not) + (
1
σo
− 1
σE
)ln(Lot) (5)
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The relative wage of migrants to natives can thus be expressed with the following formula:
ln
(
wMot
wNot
)
= ln(βot)− 1
σE
ln
(
Mot
Not
)
(6)
Where, net of changes in productivity captured by βot, the wage ratio of migrants to natives in each
occupation depends on their relative supply, weighted by the inverse of their elasticity of substitution.
To estimate equation (6) econometrically we have to set a restriction by forcing βot to vary additively
by occupation and time, as done by Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012): βot = fo + ft. As
previously explained, the richness of our data allows us to go one step further and look at the production
process within each firm, instead of approximating the behavior of a representative firm. To do that we
add establishment fixed effects and we obtain the following equation to be estimated:
ln(WM,Niot ) = α0 + α1ln(L
M,N
iot ) + fi + fo + ft + iot (7)
Where WM,Niot is calculated using the wage ratio of migrants to natives, and L
M,N
iot is computed using
the hiring ratio of migrants to natives within each plant i, occupation o and time t16. α1 is equal
to − 1σE and allows to recover the elasticity of substitution between migrants and natives. A common
assumption in the literature is that, after controlling for changes in productivity through the different
layers of fixed effects, the changes in relative supply of workers can be treated as exogenous and thus
the relation can be estimated using OLS. However, there are reasons to believe that this might not be
accurate, since relative wages might influence relative supply of workers through other channels than
changes in productivity. For this reason, we compare the OLS results with an IV strategy using the
reform as exogenous instrument for LM,Niot , as follows:
ln(LM,Niot ) = β0 + β1Dor ∗ Post2008t + β2Xiot + fi + fo + ft + υiot (8)
16To increase the sample size of establishments x occupations for which we observe both migrants and natives, here we
rely on the complete DADS dataset which includes the universe of private sector employees, instead of the 1/12th sample
used in the reduced form analysis. Similarly, to increase the power in the estimation we extend the period of analysis to
2004-2012.
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ln(WM,Niot ) = α0 + α1ln
̂(LM,Niot ) + α2Xiot + fi + fo + ft + iot (9)
The sample is restricted to the treatment and control occupations as defined in the previous sections,
and therefore results are to be interpreted as the degree of substitution in these set of technical compe-
tencies.
Table 7: Elasticity of substitution between migrants and natives
(1) (2) (3)
Log ratio wages migrants to natives
log ratio new hires
migrants to natives
VARIABLES OLS IV FS
log ratio new hires migrants to natives -0.0156*** -0.110*
(0.00312) (0.0646)
Treat * Post reform (instrument) 0.183***
(0.0405)
Observations 12,568 12,568 12,568
R-squared 0.483 0.429 0.640
C-D Wald F-stat 22.49
K-P rk Wald F-stat 20.31
Estimated degree of substitution 64.1 9.1
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Occupation FE Yes Yes Yes
Plant FE Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include firm, occupation and year fixed effects. Period of analysis: 2004-2012.
Column (1) of Table 7 reports the results obtained with the OLS estimation, column (2) reports the
ones from the IV estimation, and column (3) shows the first stage results. From the OLS estimation we
obtain that an increase in the relative supply of migrant workers by 1% decreases their relative wage by
0.02%, which translates into an elasticity of substitution parameter of about 64 (arguably close to perfect
substitution). The IV estimation results, however, show an elasticity of substitution of about 9, which
is seven times smaller than the OLS. This suggests that linear models may lead to the over-estimation
of the degree of substitution between migrants and natives, which appear to be imperfect substitutes in
production even when they are employed by the same firm and in the same occupation. This may be
explained by the fact that they can differ in their level of seniority, management responsibilities, precise
task specialization or other dimensions that are too fine to be captured by the occupational classification.
While the magnitude of the measured parameter has to be interpreted in the context of the specific set
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of occupations concerned by the reform, the existence of a bias in the OLS estimation may extend to
other contexts, and corroborates results from Card (2009), which found a similar bias using a shift-share
instrument on education x city cells. The first stage shows that the reform significantly increased the
relative supply of migrants to natives and that the instrument is strong according to conventional levels.
Finally, Table A9 in the Appendix shows the reduced form results on both the relative supply and the
relative wage of migrants to natives, which confirm what found in the main analysis.
6 Conclusion
This paper takes advantage of a migration reform introduced in France in 2008 to evaluate the impact of a
quasi-exogenous increase in high skill immigrant workers on the labor market outcomes of natives working
in the same jobs. The policy setting allows to identify very precisely the list of occupations affected
by the legal change and provides a natural control group for a difference-in-differences identification.
Additionally, the richness of the administrative data used makes it possible to measure the effect on
hiring patterns, employment stocks and wages and to distinguish between the outcomes on natives and
foreign workers. Finally, the paper exploits the exogenous source of variation in the relative labor supply
of migrants with respect to natives to recover the elasticity of substitution parameter with an IV strategy
and compare it with the same measure obtained through OLS.
The results from the main empirical analysis show that the hiring of non-European workers increased
within targeted occupations, while native employment flows remained largely unaffected. The reform was
thus able to alleviate the problem of skill-shortages, at least in the short run. We also detect a negative
pressure on entry wages that is twice as large on foreign salaries that on natives ones, signaling that
natives are in part shielded from the additional competition generated by the reform. The results are
robust to a variety of tests and the heterogeneity analysis reveals that they are driven by occupations that
were aﬄicted by severe hiring difficulties prior to the policy. The analysis on the elasticity of substitution
parameter reveal that, in this particular set of occupations, natives and migrants are imperfect substitutes
in production, even when they are employed by the same firm to do the same job. In addition, the
standard OLS estimations seem to over-estimate the parameter of interest.
From a policy perspective, favoring high-skill immigration seem to be an effective tool to counter
domestic skill shortages, at least in the short run, and the cost paid paid by native workers appear to
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be limited. Further analysis should be undertaken to test whether in the long run this kind of policies
generate any disincentives for the adaptation of the domestic education system, since they help providing
the needed competencies from abroad. An important criticism of this policy reside in the fact that the list
has remained unchanged up to this date, while the needs of the labor market have significantly evolved
over the past ten years. The periodic adaptation of the list, as it is done in the UK for instance, might
help maximize the support given to domestic firms and minimize the cost for local labor.
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Table A2: Placebo tests, alternative treatment and p-score correction on flow outcomes
Share of migrant hires P. net positive entry of natives P. net positive entry of migrants
Placebo
reform 2007
Placebo
treatment
Placebo
reform 2007
Placebo
treatment
Placebo
reform 2007
Placebo
treatment
VARIABLES FCT LOGIT FCT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT
Treat * Post Reform 1.008 0.917** 0.956*** 1.008 0.956 0.980
(0.0451) (0.0403) (0.0156) (0.0165) (0.0386) (0.0408)
Observations 201,859 163,186 348,264 297,168 348,144 297,052
Pseudo R-squared - - 0.0138 0.0125 0.107 0.110
Alternative
control
p-score
correction
Alternative
control
p-score
correction
Alternative
control
p-score
correction
VARIABLES FCT LOGIT FCT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT
Treat * Post Reform 1.104*** 1.136*** 1.001 1.009 1.108*** 1.137***
(0.0367) (0.0369) (0.0118) (0.0115) (0.0327) (0.0338)
Observations 392,620 333,517 668,860 588,514 667,729 588,400
Pseudo R-squared - - 0.0118 0.0124 0.104 0.104
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at firm level. All regressions include occupation, region, sector and year fixed effects. Coefficients reported in
exponentiated form. Period of analysis: 2004-2010. The Fractional logit model is a glm estimator of the binomial family that uses a logit
link function. It was first proposed by Papke & Wooldridge (1996) to accomodate zero-inflated fractional outcomes. Placebo reform
refers to regressions on the period 2004-2007 where 2007 is the placebo post-reform period. Placebo treatment refers to regressions
where only the control occupations are included and placebo treatment is assigned to 50% of control occupations with the highest level
of tension before the reform. Alternative control restrict the sample to occupations in the 4th anf 5th percentile of tension distribution
and defines the control group as all the occupations that are not treated (regardless of whether they enter the extended list). P-score
correction refers to regressions controlling for the propensity to be treated given the pre-reform level of tension in occupation.
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Table A3: Placebo tests, alternative treatment and p-score correction on stock and salary outcomes
Log salary natives Log salary migrants Log N. employees
Placebo
reform 2007
Placebo
treatment
Placebo
reform 2007
Placebo
treatment
Placebo
reform 2007
Placebo
treatment
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Treat x Post Reform 0.00217 0.00793** -0.00204 0.00806 -0.00208 0.00445
(0.00308) (0.00394) (0.00756) (0.00830) (0.00264) (0.00398)
Observations 257,358 223,463 37,483 34,130 282,634 246,429
R-squared 0.780 0.786 0.822 0.823 0.545 0.559
Alternative
control
P-score
correction
Alternative
control
P-score
correction
Alternative
control
P-score
correction
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Treat x Post Reform -0.00264 -0.00327 -0.0294*** -0.0351*** 0.0116*** 0.00768***
(0.00256) (0.00268) (0.00768) (0.00722) (0.00267) (0.00262)
Observations 587,114 433,283 73,968 60,558 638,425 473,661
R-squared 0.697 0.713 0.774 0.771 0.495 0.492
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include firm, occupation, region, sector and year fixed effects. Period of analysis: 2004-2010. Placebo reform
refers to regressions on the period 2004-2007 where 2007 is the placebo post-reform period. Placebo treatment refers to
regressions where only the control occupations are included and placebo treatment is assigned to 50% of control occupations
with the highest level of tension before the reform. Alternative control restrict the sample to occupations in the 4th anf 5th
percentile of tension distribution and defines the control group as all the occupations that are not treated (regardless of whether
they enter the extended list). P-score correction refers to regressions controlling for the propensity to be treated given the
pre-reform level of tension in occupation.
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Table A4: Placebo tests, alternative treatment and p-score correction on additional salary outcomes
Log salary new entrants Log salary incumbent workers
Placebo
reform 2007
Placebo
treatment
Alternative
control
P-score
correction
Placebo
reform 2007
Placebo
treatment
Alternative
control
P-score
correction
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Panel A: Natives
Treat x Post Reform -0.00928 0.0348 -0.0594*** -0.0685*** 0.00104 0.00252 -0.00123 0.000821
(0.0152) (0.0253) (0.0111) (0.0133) (0.00317) (0.00403) (0.00257) (0.00275)
Observations 67,745 44,389 133,012 91,411 213,329 195,754 508,411 377,427
R-squared 0.831 0.834 0.726 0.761 0.793 0.797 0.724 0.733
Panel B: Migrants
Treat x Post Reform -0.0354 -0.0198 -0.0999*** -0.136*** 0.00661 -0.000539 -0.0203*** -0.0191***
(0.0384) (0.0462) (0.0376) (0.0376) (0.00749) (0.00844) (0.00739) (0.00709)
Observations 11,189 8,275 20,247 15,486 29,625 28,545 60,154 50,072
R-squared 0.842 0.859 0.784 0.800 0.851 0.844 0.819 0.806
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at the firm level. All regressions include firm, occupation, region, sector and year fixed effects. Period of analysis:
2004-2010. Placebo reform refers to regressions on the period 2004-2007 where 2007 is the placebo post-reform period. Placebo treatment
refers to regressions where only the control occupations are included and placebo treatment is assigned to 50% of control occupations with
the highest level of tension before the reform. Alternative control restrict the sample to occupations in the 4th anf 5th percentile of tension
distribution and defines the control group as all the occupations that are not treated (regardless of whether they enter the extended list).
P-score correction refers to regressions controlling for the propensity to be treated given the pre-reform level of tension in occupation.
Table A5: Flow results adding different levels of fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Share of migrant hires P. net positive entry of natives P. net positive entry of migrants
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Treat * Post Reform 0.0036*** 0.0039*** 0.0064*** 0.0026* 0.0011 -0.0017 -0.0051 -0.0024 0.0044*** 0.0038*** 0.0080*** 0.0026**
(0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0029) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0012)
Observations 333,519 333,519 333,519 333,519 588,521 588,521 588,521 588,521 588,521 588,521 588,521 588,521
R-squared 0.038 0.303 0.001 0.304 0.016 0.213 0.014 0.214 0.039 0.195 0.002 0.196
Occupation FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm x Occupation FE yes yes yes
Sector x year FE yes yes yes
Mean baseline treatment 0.031 0.366 0.035
TE in % change 12% 13% 21% 9% 0% 0% -1% -1% 13% 11% 23% 7%
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at firm level. All regressions include sector and year fixed effects. Period of analysis: 2004-2010. The last row reports the treatment effect in terms
of percentage change from the pre-reform levels to ease interpretation.
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Table A6: Stock and salary results adding different levels of fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Log salary natives Log salary migrants Log N. employees
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Treat x Post Reform -0.0107*** -0.00323 0.000203 -0.00377 -0.0574*** -0.0351*** -0.0139*** -0.0279*** 0.0076*** 0.0077*** 0.0076*** 0.0080**
(0.00256) (0.00268) (0.00212) (0.00282) (0.00677) (0.00721) (0.00511) (0.00786) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0037)
Observations 433,289 433,289 433,289 433,289 60,559 60,559 60,559 60,559 473,668 473,668 473,668 473,579
R-squared 0.517 0.713 0.023 0.713 0.488 0.771 0.031 0.772 0.236 0.492 0.001 0.467
Occupation FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm x Occup FE yes yes yes
Sector x year FE yes yes yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at the firm level. Sector and year fixed effects included in all regressions. Period of analysis: 2004-2010.
Table A7: Flow results using different sub-samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Share of migrant hires P. net positive entry of natives P. net positive entry of migrants
VARIABLES FCT LOGIT FCT LOGIT FCT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT LOGIT
Treat * Post Reform 1.140*** 1.120*** 1.067* 0.998 1.020 0.972** 1.127*** 1.151*** 1.013
(0.0402) (0.0398) (0.0409) (0.0122) (0.0129) (0.0122) (0.0364) (0.0373) (0.0347)
Observations 280,238 295,202 271,618 499,227 511,941 491,729 499,123 511,847 491,632
Pseudo R-squared - - - 0.0123 0.0116 0.0114 0.102 0.105 0.0917
Exclusion of 2007 yes yes yes
Exclusion of 2009 yes yes yes
Exclusion of construction sector yes yes yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at firm level. All regressions include occupation, region, sector and year fixed effects. Coefficients reported in exponentiated
form. Period of analysis: 2004-2010. The Fractional logit model is a glm estimator of the binomial family that uses a logit link function. It was first
proposed by Papke & Wooldridge (1996) to accomodate zero-inflated fractional outcomes.
Table A8: Stock and salary results using different sub-samples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Log salary natives Log salary migrants Log N. employees
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Treat x Post Reform -0.00365 -0.000271 -0.00261 -0.0409*** -0.0236*** -0.0251*** 0.00677** 0.00462* 0.00697**
(0.00300) (0.00297) (0.00301) (0.00862) (0.00745) (0.00947) (0.00308) (0.00259) (0.00306)
Observations 368,930 373,131 355,921 49,744 54,428 41,586 401,847 410,356 384,227
R-squared 0.716 0.726 0.725 0.775 0.782 0.779 0.491 0.508 0.501
Exclusion 2007 yes yes yes
Exclusion 2009 yes yes yes
Exclusion construction sector yes yes yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at the firm level. All regressions include firm, occupation, region, sector and year fixed effects. Period of analysis:
2004-2010.
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Table A9: Reduced form results from elasticity of substitution analysis
(1) (2)
log ratio new
entries migrants to
natives
Log ratio wages
migrants to natives
VARIABLES OLS OLS
Treat * Post Reform 0.122*** -0.0104**
(0.0352) (0.00470)
(0.184) (0.0213)
Observations 16,782 98,314
R-squared 0.623 0.294
Year FE Yes Yes
Occupation FE Yes Yes
Plant FE Yes Yes
Tension and plant size controls Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include firm, occupation and year fixed effects. Period of
analysis: 2004-2012.
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Figures
Figure A1: Administrative Procedure to Hire a Foreign Worker
Diagram taken from OECD (2017). The red circles identify the administrative steps relaxed by the reform.
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Figure A2: Share of Employment Concerned by the Reform by Broad Occupations and Sectors
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Figure A3: Overall Immigration Flows by Year
Figure A4: Economic Immigration Flows by Year
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Figure A5: Additional estimated outcome trends
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